Dual Labor Markets And Strategic Efficiency Wage

Mohamed Jellal () and François-Charles Wolff

International Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 17, issue 3, 99-112

Abstract: We consider a dual labor markets model in which the primary sector requires the presence of eMiciency wage, while the secondary sector is competitive. We show that the Solow condition does not hold in a Stackelberg equilibrium where the primary sector acts as a leader and the secondary one as a follower.[J41]

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1080/10168730300000006

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