Dual labor market and strategic efficiency wage

Mohamed Jellal () and François-Charles Wolff

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a dual labor markets model in which the primary sector requires the presence of efficiency wage, while the secondary sector is competitive. We show that the Solow condition does not hold in a Stackelberg equilibrium where the primary sector acts as a leader and the secondary one as a follower.

Keywords: Solow condition; efficiency wage; dual labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dual Labor Markets And Strategic Efficiency Wage (2003)
Working Paper: Dual labor markets and strategic efficiency wage (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38395

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