Dual labor markets and strategic efficiency wage

Mohamed Jellal and François-Charles Wolff
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Mohamed Jellal: Groupe École Supérieure de Commerce de Toulouse - ESCT - Groupe École Supérieure de Commerce de Toulouse - ESCT

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Abstract: We consider a dual labor markets model in which the primary sector requires the presence of efficiency wage, while the secondary sector is competitive. We show that the Solow condition does not hold in a Stackelberg equilibrium where the primary sector acts as a leader and the secondary one as a follower.

Keywords: Solow condition; efficiency wage; dual labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03913200
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Published in International Economic Journal, 2003, 17 (3), pp.99-112. ⟨10.1080/10168730300000006⟩

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Journal Article: Dual Labor Markets And Strategic Efficiency Wage (2003)
Working Paper: Dual labor market and strategic efficiency wage (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03913200

DOI: 10.1080/10168730300000006

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