Aumann's and Schelling's Game Theory: The Nobel Prize in Economic Science, 2005

S. Abu Turab Rizvi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: S. Abu Turab Rizvi () and Akber Rizvi, Sr.

Review of Political Economy, 2007, vol. 19, issue 3, 297-316

Abstract: Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 2005. Their work in game theory shows two different approaches to understanding strategic interaction. Schelling's work on the strategic aspects of negotiations, focal points, and self-command is mathematically informal and is based on experimental and inductive knowledge of players' capabilities. Aumann's work on repeated games and common knowledge is mathematically deductive, and assumes highly rational agents. An exploration of their work allows for a comparison of these two approaches.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/09538250701452990

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