Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

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,: JSPS Research Fellow/Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
,: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Shigehiro Serizawa

Theoretical Economics, 2015, vol. 10, issue 2

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The ``minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule'' is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit{individual rationality}, and \textit{no subsidy for losers}. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.

Keywords: Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium; simultaneous ascending auction; strategy-proofness; efficiency; heterogeneous objects; non-quasi-linear preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule (2012)
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