Do Agents Game Their Agents' Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers
Alan Benson
Journal of Labor Economics, 2015, vol. 33, issue 4, 863 - 890
Abstract:
This paper examines how sales managers, acting as agents of the firm, game the staffing and incentives of their subordinates. Sales managers on a quota's cusp have a unique personal incentive to retain and lower quotas for poor-performing subordinates, allowing one to isolate a manager's interest from the firm's. Using microdata from 244 firms that subscribe to a cloud-based service for processing sales compensation, I estimate that 13%-15% of both quota adjustments and retentions among poor performers are explained by managers' incentives around quotas. Although a minority of poor performers are subsequently terminated or transferred, most are retained indefinitely.
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/681107
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