Motivating Agents: How Much Does the Mission Matter?

Jeffrey Carpenter and Erick Gong

Journal of Labor Economics, 2016, vol. 34, issue 1, 211 - 236

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that agents work harder if they believe in the mission of the organization. We conduct a real-effort experiment with workers whose mission preferences are known, randomly assigning them to organizations with clear missions to create both matches and mismatches. Our estimates suggest that matching is a strong motivator, especially compared to mismatches. Further, we find that performance pay increases effort, though mostly among mismatched workers who substitute pay for matching. Our results suggest the importance of defining a clear mission to an organization and highlight the significance of sorting, screening, and compensation policies.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (78)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682345 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682345 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Motivating Agents: How Much Does the Mission Matter? (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/682345

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().