Rules versus Discretion in Public Service: Teacher Hiring in Mexico

Ricardo Estrada

Journal of Labor Economics, 2019, vol. 37, issue 2, 545 - 579

Abstract: This paper compares the performance of teachers hired on the basis of a standardized exam to those hired at the union’s discretion in Mexico. My results show that the discretionary hires perform considerably worse than the rule-based hires (as measured by value added to student achievement). The evidence presented here shows the impact of personnel selection mechanisms on the quality of public service delivery.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rules Rather than Discretion: Teacher Hiring and Rent Extraction (2015)
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