Rules Rather than Discretion: Teacher Hiring and Rent Extraction
No MWP2015/14, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute
Because of data limitations, there is little empirical research on how firms conduct hiring and the merits of different recruitment strategies. In this paper, I take advantage of a unique setting that allows me to compare the quality (value-added to student achievement) of the teachers hired in a discretionary proce3ss led by the teachers' union in Mexico with those hired on the basis of a screening rule. My results show that the teachers' union selects applicants of a considerably lower quality than those selected using a standardized test, despite the fact that the test has no power to predict teacher quality. I find evidence that the results are not explained by the self-selection of high-quality teachers to follow the test-based process. The combination of these results indicates that the teachers selected through the discretionary process are from the bottom of the distribution of applicant quality. My analysis also reveals that joint committees of state officials and union representatives allocate teachers hired in this way to schools in more "desirable" localities, but with similar pre-treatment trends in outcomes. Findings are consistent with standard models of rent extraction.
Keywords: Hiring methods; Teachers' unions; School quality; Teacher hiring; Rent extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 J51 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36535/MWP_2015_14.pdf main text
Journal Article: Rules versus Discretion in Public Service: Teacher Hiring in Mexico (2019)
Working Paper: Rules vs. Discretion in Public Service: Teacher Hiring in Mexico (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:mwp2015/14
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economics Working Papers from European University Institute Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cécile Brière ().