Mandatory Notice

Peter Kuhn

Journal of Labor Economics, 1992, vol. 10, issue 2, 117-37

Abstract: Firms' incentives to inform workers about their future viability are analyzed using a two-period signaling model. The author finds that, if wages can be set after firms learn their viability, they will perfectly signal firms' closure plans. Mandatory-notice laws, if they have any effect at all, reduce worker utility and raise profits because they obviate the need for "permanent" firms to signal via higher wages. If a noncontingent wage must be set before any private information arrives, pooling occurs in the absence of legislation and mandatory-notice laws can be Pareto improving. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1992
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