Unions and Cooperative Behavior: The Effect of Discounting

Lawrence Kahn

Journal of Labor Economics, 1993, vol. 11, issue 4, 680-703

Abstract: Using union contract and industry wage survey data, this article examines the effect of discounting on cooperative bargaining behavior by unions and firms. Game theory predicts that higher discount rates raise the temptation to defect from cooperation. Measures of cooperative behavior include the presence of merit pay, incentive pay, wage-employment guarantees, or labor-management study committees. Discount rates are proxied by the relevant industry's failure rate. Failure rates generally had negative effects on cooperation. Industy Wage Survey results showed larger effects for union than nonunion establishments, providing support for the union bargaining framework. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/298311 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:11:y:1993:i:4:p:680-703

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().