Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of A Multistage Arbitration Game
Paul Pecorino () and
Mark Van Boening
Journal of Labor Economics, 2001, vol. 19, issue 4, 922-48
We conduct an experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (FOA) with differentially informed players. Under FOA, the arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers. In our control, the uninformed player makes an offer to the informed player prior to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. The treatment allows negotiation after offers are submitted to the arbitrator. Because these offers are potentially binding, they may transmit privately held information and, thereby, lower the dispute rate. We find that allowing negotiation in the face of potentially binding offers lowers the dispute rate by 27 percentage points. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/322825 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:19:y:2001:i:4:p:922-48
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().