Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-Sponsored Training

Hideo Owan

Journal of Labor Economics, 2004, vol. 22, issue 4, 955-978

Abstract: I develop a model in which different technological conditions lead to distinct equilibria with different patterns in labor mobility, promotion, earning distribution, and provision of firm-sponsored training. Key is the asymmetric learning of workers' characteristics. Because of the information that is conveyed to the market by promotion, firms have incentives to adopt strategic promotion policies, which result in different patterns in the use of internal labor market. The theory explains well the differences between the Japanese and the United States labor markets.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/423160 main text (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:22:y:2004:i:4:p:955-954

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().