Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts

Ola Kvaløy and Trond Olsen

Journal of Labor Economics, 2006, vol. 24, issue 1, 139-170

Abstract: The article analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively, joint, relative, and independent performance in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two interacting agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends crucially on the productivity of the agents. This occurs because agents' productivities affect the principal's temptation to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we will see a higher frequency of relative performance evaluationand schemes that lie close to independent performance evaluationas we move from low-productive to high-productive environments.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:24:y:2006:i:1:p:139-170

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