The Strategic Bequest Motive

B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers

Journal of Labor Economics, 1986, vol. 4, issue 3, S151-82

Abstract: Although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation, our under standing of bequest motives remains incomplete. The authors develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries' actions. The model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers. The authors present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0734-306X%2819860 ... O%3B2-N&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE for details.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Strategic Bequest Motive (1986)
Journal Article: The Strategic Bequest Motive (1985)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:4:y:1986:i:3:p:s151-82

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().