The Exclusionary Rule Revisited

Nuno Garoupa and Murat Mungan

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2022, vol. 51, issue 1, 209 - 248

Abstract: We revisit the economic theory of exclusionary rules. First, we show that more exclusion may induce enforcers to conduct more searches, contrary to the standard notion that more exclusion leads to fewer searches. Second, we identify and investigate the complexities that arise when enforcers may harass suspects (imposing significant costs without legal proceedings) instead of conducting legal searches. If one attempts to choose the optimal exclusionary rule naively (for example, by ignoring the possibility of harassment by enforcers), the chosen rule will exclude evidence more often than is optimal. We explore social welfare considerations and discuss policy implications based on our formal results.

Date: 2022
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