The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market
Michael Bradley,
James D. Cox and
Mitu Gulati
The Journal of Legal Studies, 2010, vol. 39, issue 1, 289-324
Abstract:
In September 2000, a Brussels court ruled in favor of a hedge fund that held an unpaid debt claim against the Republic of Peru. The decision was based on a novel interpretation of the common pari passu clause. Policy makers and practitioners suggested that this decision signaled a paradigm shift that caused a significant increase in the risk of holdout litigation faced by sovereign debtors. Over the ensuing years, multiple reform solutions were implemented including the revision of certain contractual terms, the filing of amicus briefs in a key New York case, and the passage of legislation in Belgium. This article investigates whether the markets perceived an increase in risk in sovereign debt in the wake of the Brussels court decision. And, to the extent the markets reacted to the increase in legal risk, did any of the antidotes that were implemented to reduce the supposed increased holdout risk work? (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:289-324
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