The Private Returns to Public Office

Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig

Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 122, issue 4, 806 - 862

Abstract: We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (88)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676334 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676334 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Private Returns to Public Office (2012)
Working Paper: Private Returns to Public Office (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/676334

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().