Private Returns to Public Office

Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig

No 18095, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency comparison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections, we rule out a range of alternative explanations for differential earnings of politicians and a relevant control group. The ``winner's premium" comes from parliamentarians holding positions in the Council of Ministers, with asset returns 13 to 29 percentage points higher than non-winners. The benefit of winning is also concentrated among incumbents, because of low asset growth for incumbent non-winners.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: CF LE LS PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Raymond Fisman & Florian Schulz & Vikrant Vig, 2014. "The Private Returns to Public Office," Journal of Political Economy, vol 122(4), pages 806-862.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Private Returns to Public Office (2014)
Working Paper: Private Returns to Public Office (2012)
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