Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation

Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal

Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 128, issue 1, 1 - 31

Abstract: We study the class of multiround, multiproduct clock procurement auctions that reduce offered prices at each round. When prices stop declining, the remaining bidders become the winning sellers. For single-minded bidders, each such auction has five properties not shared by Vickrey auctions: each is obviously strategy-proof and group-strategy-proof, sets prices that are Nash equilibrium winning bids in the related first-price auction, preserves winner privacy about values, and can be extended to satisfy a budget constraint. In simulations of the US incentive auction, a heuristic clock auction from this class achieves quick computations, high efficiency, and low prices.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/704074 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/704074 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704074

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().