Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles

Frederico Finan and Maurizio Mazzocco

Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 133, issue 8, 2414 - 2461

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of politicians who can engage in corruption. The model provides important insights into the determinants of corruption and how to design policies to combat it. We estimate the model using data from Brazil to measure voters’ willingness to pay for various commonly proposed anticorruption policies, such as increasing audit probabilities, raising politicians’ wages, and extending term limits. We document that while audit policies effectively reduce corruption, a multipronged approach that bundles an audit policy with other policies can achieve much higher welfare gains.

Date: 2025
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