A Model of Social Duties

Tore Ellingsen and Erik Mohlin

Journal of Political Economy, 2026, vol. 134, issue 5, 1307 - 1346

Abstract: We develop and test a model of social duties. The model distinguishes unconditional duties to take or avoid certain actions from conditional duties that depend on the actions’ payoffs. It also distinguishes strict duties (must do) from liberal duties (ought to do). The disutility associated with duty violation depends on the duty’s strictness and is proportional to the externality the violation causes. The model rationalizes behavioral patterns that are incompatible with consequentialist preferences. Our tests comprise parameter estimation based on subjects’ behavior across different situations as well as measurement of duties through spectators’ appropriateness ratings.

Date: 2026
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Working Paper: A Model of Social Duties (2022)
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