On Strategic Community Development

J. Vernon Henderson and Jacques Thisse

Journal of Political Economy, 2001, vol. 109, issue 3, 546-569

Abstract: This paper examines strategic behavior of developers who, through offering different congested public-good packages and revenue/fiscal schemes, compete for residents who are differentiated by income. There is an endogenous determination of numbers and sizes of communities. Developers have an incentive to strongly differentiate their public-good offerings. In terms of pricing strategies, developers exhibit sharply contrasting behaviors. In low-income communities, housing consumption is subsidized once lots are priced. In high-income communities housing consumption is generally taxed.

Date: 2001
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Working Paper: On strategic community development (2001)
Working Paper: On the Strategic Community Development (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:3:p:546-569

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