On the Strategic Community Development

J Vernon Henderson and Jacques Thisse

No 1550, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper examines strategic behaviour of developers who, through offering different public good packages and revenue/fiscal schemes, compete for residents who are differentiated by income. There is an endogenous determination of numbers and sizes of communities. Developers have an incentive to strongly differentiate their public good offerings. In terms of pricing strategies, developers exhibit sharply contrasting behaviours. In low-income communities housing consumption is subsidized once lots are priced. In high-income communities housing consumption is generally taxed.

Keywords: Land development; Strategic pricing; Tax Competition; Tiebout Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 L13 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On Strategic Community Development (2001)
Working Paper: On strategic community development (2001)
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