The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism

Steven Tadelis

Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, issue 4, 854-882

Abstract: Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short-lived agents to work hard, but it is well known that these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium model with moral hazard and adverse selection generates two main results. First, incentives of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless" with a market for reputations. Second, good reputations cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot outbid lesser ones in the market for good reputations. In addition, welfare analysis shows that social surplus can fall if clients observe trade in firm reputations.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:4:p:854-882

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