Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency Versus Specific-Capital

Shulamit Kahn and Kevin Lang

Journal of Human Resources, 1992, vol. 27, issue 4, 661-678

Abstract: Lifetime contracts imply that at a given time, wages and value of marginal product (VMP) will diverge. The contract will specify hours as well as wages, since firms will desire to prevent workers from working more when the wage is greater than VMP and from working less when the wage is less than VMP. If hours are set efficiently, workers will face binding hours constraints. The agency model and the firm-specific capital models make opposite predictions regarding the relation between work hours constraints and job tenure. We test these predictions. Our results indicate that neither model explains the observed pattern of hours constraints.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/146080
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:27:y:1992:i:4:p:661-678

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Human Resources from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().