Labor Market Frictions and Moving Costs of the Employed and Unemployed

Tyler Ransom

Journal of Human Resources, 2022, vol. 57, issue S, s137-s166

Abstract: Search frictions and switching costs may grant monopsony power to incumbent employers by reducing workers’ outside options. This paper examines the role of labor market frictions and moving costs in explaining worker flows across U.S. labor markets. Using data on non-college-educated workers from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), I estimate a dynamic model of job search and location choice. I find that moving costs are substantial and that labor market frictions primarily inhibit the employed. Reducing these frictions would result in a higher wage elasticity of labor supply to the firm and could reduce employer monopsony power.

JEL-codes: C35 E32 J22 J61 J64 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.0219-10013R2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Labor Market Frictions and Moving Costs of the Employed and Unemployed (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:57:y:2022:i:s:p:s137-s166

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