Charity auctions: a field experiment

Jeffrey Carpenter, Jessica Holmes and Peter Matthews

Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 118, issue 525, 92-113

Abstract: Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. We conduct field experiments to see which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all‐pay, raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all‐pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02105.x

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