Game of Zones: The Political Economy of Conservation Areas

Gabriel Ahlfeldt, Kristoffer Moeller, Sevrin Waights and Nicolai Wendland

Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 127, issue 605, F421-F445

Abstract: We develop a simple theory of the conservation area designation process in which we postulate that the level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. Conservation areas provide benefits to local homeowners by reducing uncertainty regarding the future of their area. The restrictions, however, impose a cost by limiting the degree to which properties can be altered. In line with our model predictions we find that an increase in preferences for historic character by the local population increases the likelihood of a designation, and that new designations are not associated with significant house price capitalisation effects.

Date: 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12454

Related works:
Working Paper: Game of zones: the political economy of conservation areas (2017)
Working Paper: Game of zones: The political economy of conservation areas (2016)
Working Paper: Game of Zones: The Political Economy of Conservation Areas (2014)
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