Game of zones: The political economy of conservation areas

Gabriel Ahlfeldt, Möller, Kristoffer, Sevrin Waights and Nicolai Wendland
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kristoffer Moeller

No 11146, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop and test a simple theory of the conservation area designation process in which we postulate that the level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. Conservation areas provide benefits to local homeowners by reducing uncertainty regarding the future of their area. At the same time, the restrictions impose a cost by limiting the degree to which properties can be altered. In line with our model predictions we find that an increase in preferences for historic character by the local pop-ulation increases the likelihood of a designation, and that new designations at the margin are not associat-ed with significant house price capitalisation effects.

Keywords: Designation; Difference-in-differences; England; Gentrification; Heritage; Property value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H31 R40 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Game of zones: the political economy of conservation areas (2017)
Working Paper: Game of Zones: The Political Economy of Conservation Areas (2014)
Working Paper: Game of zones: the economics of conservation areas (2013)
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