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Non‐performance Pay and Relational Contracting: Evidence from CEO Compensation

Jed DeVaro, Jin‐Hyuk Kim and Nick Vikander

Economic Journal, 2018, vol. 128, issue 613, 1923-1951

Abstract: CEOs are routinely compensated for aspects of firm performance that are beyond their control. This is puzzling from an agency perspective, which assumes performance pay should be efficient. Working within an agency framework, we provide a rational for this seemingly inefficient feature of CEO compensation by invoking the idea of informal agreements, specifically the theory of relational contracting. We derive observable implications to distinguish relational from formal contracting and, using ExecuComp data, find that CEOs' annual cash and equity incentive payments positively correlate with the cyclical component of sales and respond to measures of persistence as relational contracting theory predicts.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton

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