Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Econometrica, 2015, vol. 83, 587-616

Abstract: We study social dilemmas in (quasi‐) continuous‐time experiments, comparing games with different durations and termination rules. We discover a stark qualitative contrast in behavior in continuous time as compared to previously studied behavior in discrete‐time games: cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones, and end‐game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience. Analysis of individual strategies provides a basis for a simple reinforcement learning model that proves to be consistent with this evidence. An additional treatment lends further support to this explanation.

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2013)
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2013)
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2011)
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2011)
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