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Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Maria Bigoni (), Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp796

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