Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo

No 1116, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Abstract: We study interactions with different durations and termination rules in a (quasi) continuous-time prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We find that cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones; end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience; longer duration helps cooperation. Static theories for continuous-time games cannot simultaneously account for these findings and miss the evolution of behavior across supergames. We propose a simple model – based on the replicator dynamics – that proves consistent with this evidence. The analysis of strategies and an additional treatment lend further support to the proposed explanation.

Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2011, Revised 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2015)
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2013)
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2011)
Working Paper: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:1116

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