On Probation: An Experimental Analysis

Christoph Engel, Heike Hennig‐Schmidt, Bernd Irlenbusch and Sebastian Kube

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2015, vol. 12, issue 2, 252-288

Abstract: Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta‐study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover, it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the existing field evidence with a novel lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers are more likely to recidivate (i.e., to reduce their contributions to a joint project), that punishment cost is higher, efficiency lower, and inequity higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically, those not punished themselves trust the institution less if punishment does not become immediately effective.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12072

Related works:
Working Paper: On Probation. An Experimental Analysis (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:12:y:2015:i:2:p:252-288

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().