Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment

Florian Englmaier and Markus Reisinger

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2014, vol. 35, issue 5, 350-356

Abstract: This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment (2014)
Working Paper: Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:35:y:2014:i:5:p:350-356

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