Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment

Florian Englmaier and Markus Reisinger

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Managerial and Decision Economics 5 35(2014): pp. 350-356

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