Asymmetric Regulation and Airport Dominance in International Aviation: Evidence from the London‐New York Market

Volodymyr Bilotkach

Southern Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 74, issue 2, 505-523

Abstract: International airline markets have the rather unusual feature of partial deregulation with asymmetric regulatory constraints: Some carriers face entry restrictions different from others for a given route. Like domestic air travel, international travel also features hubs, where a single carrier may dominate a given airport. This article examines the effects of asymmetric regulation and airport dominance on airlines' fares in the London‐New York market, a market uniquely suited for identifying the effects of both of these issues. Comparison data from the symmetrically regulated Frankfurt‐New York and Paris‐New York markets enable a difference‐in‐differences identification strategy. Regulatory restrictions are found to decrease an affected carrier's fares, whereas airport dominance increases a dominant airline's fares.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2007:i:2:p:505-523

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