Gerrymandering in the laboratory

SunAh An, Michael Anderson and Cary Deck (cary.deck@ua.edu)

Southern Economic Journal, 2023, vol. 90, issue 1, 182-213

Abstract: Gerrymandering, the drawing of electoral boundaries for political advantage, is a controversial political topic. Previous theoretical work has treated gerrymandering as a one‐stage strategic game against nature, but this paper treats drawing districts as the first stage in a two stage game where parties subsequently compete for undecided voters within districts. In a laboratory experiment, subjects overwhelmingly engage in gerrymandering, which maximizes their probability of winning a majority of the districts and maximizes their expected payoff. However, the subjects self‐report being opposed to the practice in politics regardless of their own political ideology. When forced to draw the electoral map behind a veil of ignorance, the subjects indicate a clear preference for symmetric maps although not the map with the highest theoretical expected payoff. Additionally, while subjects overspend in second stage competition, average spending is similar across electoral maps.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12638

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:90:y:2023:i:1:p:182-213

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