A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES
Dimitrios Tsomocos and
Dimitrios Voliotis ()
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 04, 479-489
We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.
Keywords: Market games; bounded rationality; rational learning; C70; D51; D81; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games (2005)
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