EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES

Dimitrios Tsomocos and Dimitrios Voliotis ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 04, 479-489

Abstract: We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

Keywords: Market games; bounded rationality; rational learning; C70; D51; D81; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198909002467
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
Working Paper: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:n:s0219198909002467

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002467

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2021-04-02
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:n:s0219198909002467