A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games
Dimitrios Tsomocos and
Dimitrios Voliotis ()
OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre
We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.
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Journal Article: A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2005fe14
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