A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games

Dimitrios Tsomocos and Dimitrios Voliotis ()

OFRC Working Papers Series from Oxford Financial Research Centre

Abstract: We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games (2005)
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