Social networks and organizational helping behavior: Experimental evidence from the helping game

Hande Erkut and Ernesto Reuben

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2025, vol. 246, No 105388

Abstract: This paper studies the causal impact of social ties and network structure on helping behavior in organizations. We introduce and experimentally study a game called the ‘helping game,’ where individuals unilaterally decide whether to incur a cost to help other team members when helping is a rivalrous good. We find that social ties have a strong positive effect on helping behavior. Individuals are more likely to help those with whom they are connected, but the likelihood of helping decreases as the social distance between individuals increases. Additionally, individuals randomly assigned to be more central in the network are more likely to help others.

Keywords: Helping; Organizations; Social ties; Social networks; Centrality; Social distance; Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D83 D91 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Journal Article: Social networks and organizational helping behavior: Experimental evidence from the helping game (2025)
Working Paper: Social Networks and Organizational Helping Behavior: Experimental Evidence from the Helping Game (2024)
Working Paper: Social networks and organizational helping behavior: Experimental evidence from the helping game (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:344031

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105388

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