 Venture Capital and Private Equity ContractingDouglas Cumming and Sofia Johan in Elsevier Monographs from Elsevier, currently edited by Candice Janco Abstract: Other books present corporate finance approaches to the venture capital and private equity industry, but many key decisions require an understanding of the ways that law and economics work together. This revised and updated 2e offers broad perspectives and principles not found in other course books, enabling readers to deduce the economic implications of specific contract terms. This approach avoids the common pitfalls of implying that contractual terms apply equally to firms in any industry anywhere in the world. In the 2e, datasets from over 40 countries are used to analyze and consider limited partnership contracts, compensation agreements, and differences in the structure of limited partnership venture capital funds, corporate venture capital funds, and government venture capital funds. There is also an in-depth study of contracts between different types of venture capital funds and entrepreneurial firms, including security design, and detailed cash flow, control and veto rights. The implications of such contracts for value-added effort and for performance are examined with reference to data from an international perspective. With seven new or completely revised chapters covering a range of topics from Fund Size and Diseconomies of Scale to Fundraising and Regulation, this new edition will be essential for financial and legal students and researchers considering international venture capital and private equity. An analysis of the structure and governance features of venture capital contracts In-depth study of contracts between different types of venture capital funds and entrepreneurial firms Presents international datasets from over 40 countries around the world Additional references on a companion website Contains sample contracts, including limited partnership agreements, term sheets, shareholder agreements, and subscription agreements Keywords: Acquisition; Adverse selection; Advice; Agency cost; Asset stripping; Bargaining power; Bilateral moral hazard; Board seats; Buyback; Capital structure; Cash flow and control rights; Contracts; Control rights; Corporate governance; Direct government investment programs; Duration; Econometrics; Empirical contracts; Empirical venture capital; Entrepreneurial finance; Entrepreneurship; Exit; Exits; Financial contract; Financial contracting; Financial contracts; Free riding; Fund size; Governance; Hold up; Home bias; IPO; Incentive contracts; Information asymmetry; Initial public offerings; Institutional investment; International financial reporting; International venture capital; Investment duration; Law and finance; Lemon; Limited attention; Liquidation; Listed private equity; Managerial compensation; Monitoring; Moral hazard; Multitask moral hazard; Nut; Pension funds; Preplanned exit; Private equity; Private equity and portfolio diversification; Private equity valuation; Public policy; Regulation; Returns to scale; Risk; Risk shifting; Secondary sale; Securities regulation; Security design; Socially responsible investment; Staging; Statistics; Style drift; Syndication; Taxation; Trilateral bargaining; Underinvestment; Venture capital; Venture capital contracts; Venture capital exit; Venture capital portfolio; Veto rights; Window dressing; Write-off; Write-offs (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:monogr:9780124095373 Access Statistics for this book More books in Elsevier Monographs from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.