Fairness in Stackelberg Games

Steffen Huck, Manfred Königstein and Wieland Müller

Chapter 15 in Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, 2004, pp 314-323 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In experiments, it is often observed that subjects do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). There is overwhelming evidence for this claim coming from sequential bargaining games. In its simplest form, the ultimatum game, introduced by Güth et al. (1982), the Proposer is predicted to claim (almost) the entire pie for him/herself while the Responder should accept all positive offers. Contrary to this prediction, one usually observes that the modal offer made by Proposers is a 50–50 split, and that Responders reject substantial positive offers.

Keywords: Reaction Function; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Ultimatum Game; Stackelberg Game; Payoff Table (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52337-1_15

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230523371_15

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