I-deal or No I-deal? Lessons for Managers from Economic Theory

Priyanka Sharma (), Smriti Anand (), Liad Wagman and Pouya Haddadian Nekah ()
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Priyanka Sharma: Illinois Institute of Technology
Smriti Anand: Illinois Institute of Technology
Pouya Haddadian Nekah: Illinois Institute of Technology

Chapter Chapter 3 in Idiosyncratic Deals at Work, 2022, pp 45-70 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We explore the interface of idiosyncratic work arrangements (i-deals) and economic theory on private information. To that end, we model i-deals as informal supervisor-employee agreements and use the principal-agent framework from economics to form linkages between the two literatures. We first highlight that supervisor-employee interactions tend to be rife with information asymmetries, where one party may possess some information that the other party does not. Next, we link the economic concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard to i-deals, pointing out the potential negative effects of information asymmetries on supervisor-employee interactions. Lastly, we introduce two market mechanisms from economics, namely signaling and screening, that can be useful in overcoming the issues surrounding information asymmetries and emphasize their applicability to i-deals. The discussion illustrates informational reasons that may drive managers to reject i-deal arrangements, as well as potential solutions.

Keywords: Idiosyncratic deals; I-deals; Information asymmetry; Private information; Economic theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-88516-8_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-88516-8_3

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