Key Design Elements of Prediction Markets
Stefan Luckner,
Jan Schröder,
Christian Slamka,
Markus Franke,
Andreas Geyer-Schulz,
Bernd Skiera,
Martin Spann and
Christof Weinhardt
Chapter 3 in Prediction Markets, 2012, pp 11-47 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract Before studying more advanced applications of prediction markets, it is necessary to gain a basic understanding of their key design elements. Like any market, prediction markets have to be designed and implemented very carefully in order to ensure that they are suitable for aggregating traders’ information (Weinhardt et al., 2003, Weinhardt et al., 2006a). The key design elements comprise the specification of contractstraded in a prediction market, the trading mechanism, and the incentivesprovided to ensure information revelation (Spann and Skiera, 2003). Moreover, diversity of information is required in order to provide a basis for trading (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Heterogeneous expectations about the future among traders are desirable and the selection of tradersis thus also considered a key design issue (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007b). The following subsections describe these design elements in more detail.
Keywords: Incentive Scheme; National Team; Prediction Market; Trading Behavior; Trading Price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-8349-7085-5_3
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-8349-7085-5_3
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