Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions

Anna Mikusheva () and Konstantin Sonin
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Anna Mikusheva: Harvard University

No w0021, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: We study the impact of information revelation on effciency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentivecompatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: in a second-price sealed bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2002-06
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https://www.nes.ru/files/Preprints-resh/WP21.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information revelation and efficiency in auctions (2004)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
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