Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions

Konstantin Sonin and Anna Mikusheva

No 3675, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the impact of information revelation on efficiency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: in a second-price sealed-bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.

Keywords: Auctions; Information; Allocative efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-rmg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information revelation and efficiency in auctions (2004)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
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