Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions

Anna Mikusheva () and Konstantin Sonin
Additional contact information
Anna Mikusheva: Harvard University

No w0021, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Abstract: We study the impact of information revelation on effciency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentivecompatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: in a second-price sealed bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2002-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP21.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information revelation and efficiency in auctions (2004)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0021

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Julia Babich ().