Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions
Anna Mikusheva () and
Konstantin Sonin ()
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Anna Mikusheva: Harvard University
No w0021, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)
We study the impact of information revelation on effciency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentivecompatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: in a second-price sealed bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-lam
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Journal Article: Information revelation and efficiency in auctions (2004)
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0021
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