Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Timothy Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo (), Tomas Sjostrom and Takehiko Yamato ()
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Takehiko Yamato: Department of Value & Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology

No 55, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

Keywords: Experiment; Laboratory; Secure Implementation; Groves-Clarke; Pivotal; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D71 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? (2006)
Working Paper: Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work? (2003)
Working Paper: Secure Implementation Experiments:Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? (2003)
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